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in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela
Caitlin Andrews-Lee
Abstract
Charisma has long been considered a powerful tool for leaders worldwide to rise to
greatness. Yet we have given less attention to the way in which charismatic leaders
develop deep, unmediated emotional bonds with their followers. I propose a compact
theory that explains how charismatic attachments form, overwhelm alternative linkage
types, and facilitate the development of powerful and potentially enduring political
movements. To illustrate the theory, I turn to Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian movement in
Venezuela. Firstly, the analysis of a 2007 survey from the Latin American Public Opinion
Project demonstrates the disproportionate influence of charisma on citizens’ attach-
ments to Bolivarianism relative to competing factors. Next, six original focus groups
conducted with Bolivarian followers in 2016 illustrate the mechanisms underlying the
followers’ surprisingly resilient loyalty, not only to the leader but also to his overarching
movement. The results suggest that affective political attachments can help sustain
charismatic movements after their founders disappear.
Resumen
Se considera que el carisma es una herramienta poderosa que facilita el acenso de
grandes ĺıderes. Sin embargo, hemos prestado menos atención a la manera por la cual los
ĺıderes carismáticos desarrollan lazos profundos, afectivos y directos con sus seguidores.
Este trabajo propone una teorı́a compacto que explica cómo los lazos carismáticos
forman, abruman otros lazos alternativos, y facilitan el desarrollo de movimientos
poĺıticos poderosos y duraderos. Se enfoca en el movimiento bolivariano de Hugo
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Chávez en Venezuela para ilustrar la teorı́a. Primero, un análisis de una encuesta reali-
zado en el 2007 por Latin American Public Opinion Project demuestra la influencia
predominante del carisma en los lazos poĺıticos de los seguidores al Bolivarianismo.
Después, seis grupos focales originales conducidos con seguidores ilustran los meca-
nismos que mantienen la lealtad no solamente al el ĺıder, sino también a su movimiento
en general. Los resultados sugieren que los lazos poĺıticos afectivos pueden ayudar a
sostener a los movimientos carismáticos después de la desaparición de sus ĺıderes
fundadores.
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Chávez
Palabras clave
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Introduction
Charisma has long been a powerful tool for leaders to rise to greatness, as exemplified by
Perón, Chávez, Fujimori, Atatürk, de Gaulle, and Gandhi. Indeed, the deep, unmediated
emotional bonds these leaders cultivated with millions of followers were crucial in
allowing them to consolidate transformative political movements. For example, in
Argentina, Perón won the hearts of millions of workers as Secretary of Labor, paving the
way for his presidency and granting him virtually unchecked power during his rule. In
Venezuela, Chávez won the 1998 presidential elections in a landslide and used his
tremendous charismatic appeal to ratify a new constitution, propelling his Bolivarian
Revolution. Similarly, in 1958, de Gaulle leveraged his overwhelming presidential
victory and reputation as a liberator of France to found the Fifth Republic. In each of
these cases, the “personalistic” or “charismatic” ties that leader forged with his followers
were central to his ability to profoundly change the political landscape.1
Yet while personalistic attachments between leaders and followers help shape for-
midable movements across the globe, scholars widely consider this type of citizen–
politician linkage rare and ephemeral (Eatwell, 2006; Hawkins, 2010; Jowitt, 1992;
Kitschelt et al., 2010; Shils, 1965; Weber 1978 [1922]). Indeed, scholars contend that, to
survive, such attachments must lose their charismatic nature by “routinising” into atte-
nuated impersonal ties. Consequently, it remains unclear how these linkages influence
charismatic leaders’ ability to consolidate political movements and impact party systems
over time.
This article sheds light on how personalistic attachments form and facilitate the
development of charismatic movements. Using Venezuela as an illustrative case, I
combine insights from classic studies of charisma with empirical analyses of voters
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devoted to Chávez and his Bolivarian movement. Specifically, I develop and test a clear,
compact theory of personalistic attachments that offers two contributions. Firstly, I
demonstrate how the mechanisms underlying such linkages shape citizens’ identifica-
tion, not only with the individual leader but also with the larger movement. In doing so, I
also indicate the relative unimportance of programmatic and organisational factors for
movement identification. Secondly, I show that citizens’ ties to these movements have
the potential to endure in their raw and deeply emotional state rather than routinising into
depersonalised linkages, as existing literature would argue (Jowitt, 1992; Madsen and
Snow, 1991; Shils, 1965; Weber 1978 [1922]; Willner and Willner, 1965). The findings
suggest the potential for charismatic movements to live on in their original, personalistic
state after their founders disappear.
To test my theory, I first use an important survey conducted by the Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2007, at the height of Chávez’s rule, to demonstrate
the overwhelming influence of personalistic rather than programmatic or organisational
factors on citizens’ attachments to Bolivarianism. Next, I turn to six original focus
groups with Bolivarian followers conducted in 2016, three years after Chávez’s death, to
analyse how citizens’ attachments can retain their personalistic core rather than trans-
forming into depersonalised ties after the leader’s death. The results indicate that deep,
resilient attachments to charismatic movements can survive and shape citizens’ rela-
tionship with politics in the long term. I conclude by discussing avenues for future
research, including possible long-term implications of these linkages for democratic
politics and party-system development.
A Theory of Personalistic Attachment
How do leaders foster deep, unmediated emotional attachments with voters to generate
loyalty to their movements? Scholars indicate that a leader’s charisma – defined by
Weber (1978 [1922]: 241) as “supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically
exceptional powers or qualities” – plays a central role in the cultivation of these ties.
Importantly, it is not the objective existence of these characteristics, but rather the fol-
lowers’ perception of them in the leader that cultivates personalistic attachments
(Madsen and Snow, 1991; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2011; Weber 1978 [1922]; Willner
and Willner, 1965). Studies highlight different dimensions of charisma that foster per-
sonalistic bonds between leaders and followers, including the leader’s magnetic per-
sonality and extraordinary political skills (Eatwell, 2006; Pappas, 2011); the followers’
material and psychological needs (Madsen and Snow, 1991; Weber 1978 [1922]);
contextual problems such as severe crisis (Madsen and Snow, 1991; Merolla and
Zechmeister, 2011; Weyland, 2003; Weber 1978 [1922]); and discourse that glorifies the
leader, demonises the opposition, and promises societal transformation (Willner and
Willner, 1965; Zúquete, 2008). Taken together, these studies highlight important fea-
tures of charismatic ties. Yet while they emphasise voters’ affinity with individual
leaders, they overlook how these ties can foster an enduring identification with a leader’s
overarching movement.
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I propose a compact theory of personalistic attachment that rests on three conditions.
For each condition, contextual factors combine with the leader’s behaviour to shape
citizens’ attraction to the leader and, more importantly, their deep, emotional identifi-
cation with his movement. The first condition involves the leader’s direct recognition of
and appeals to citizens who have suffered severe feelings of exclusion, deprivation, and
hopelessness. The theory of “proxy control” developed in social psychology suggests
that people who have experienced these feelings are likely to seek out a charismatic
“saviour” to recognise their suffering, take control of their seemingly unmanageable
situation, and combat the “evil” forces blamed for their problems (Bandura, 1982;
Madsen and Snow, 1991: 12–15). This recognition is asymmetrical: the leader directly
grants recognition to the followers, such that the latter feel indebted to, rather than
empowered by, the former. Contextually, a severe crisis overseen by a low-performing
government motivates citizens who feel excluded to seek out a hero to rescue them from
their situation (Madsen and Snow, 1991: 143; Weyland, 2003: 843). Using this crisis, the
leader recognises and vows to personally resolve citizens’ suffering and perceived
exclusion to gain their support.
Secondly, to prove his extraordinary ability to “save” the people from their misery,
the leader aggressively attacks the “enemies” held responsible for their suffering and
implements bold, initially successful reforms to improve their condition (Pappas, 2011:
4–5; Weber 1978 [1922]: 242). These impressive initiatives confirm the followers’
exalted perceptions of their leader but lack programmatic coherence and sustainability.
Instead, the leader’s early success is most likely tied to his appearance following a period
of crisis or at the cusp of favourable economic conditions, such as rising oil prices or a
commodity boom. Nonetheless, many voters experiencing swift, tangible relief due to
his policies will perceive the leader as extraordinary.
The third condition involves the construction of a symbolic narrative that glorifies the
leader alongside other historical protagonists as a hero, vilifies opponents as enemies,
and stresses the transformative character of the movement. Crucially, to legitimate the
narrative and integrate it with the followers’ everyday lives, the leader tailors it to the
particular cultural setting in which he arises. For instance, in framing politics as an
existential struggle between good and evil, the leader ties himself to “sacred figures,
divine beings, or heroes” who already form part of the followers’ cultural identity
(Willner and Willner, 1965: 82). Equally important, he associates his opponents with
familiar, epic foes. Integrating these commonly understood prototypes of good and evil
permits the leader to reinterpret well-known historical events “within a salvation
framework” (Smith, 2000: 103–104). Because the followers are familiar with the themes
of heroism, villainy, and salvation evoked by the narrative, they perceive the leader as
more authentic and therefore feel closer to him (Gauna, 2018: 40). Through this
mechanism, the leader converts his support into an intensely personal form of “political
religion” (Zúquete, 2008: 91).
To spin a convincing narrative that the followers come to internalise as part of their
daily lives, the leader draws on personal appeal; achieves constant, direct contact with
voters; and broadcasts “contentious performances” in which he inexhaustibly repeats the
central components of his transformative mission – including the central heroes,
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enemies, and stories of redemption (Gauna, 2018: 42; Michelutti, 2017: 233–237).
Additionally, the leader dominates public spaces with images, words, music, and other
symbols to help reinforce the power and moral superiority of him and his movement
(Plotkin, 2002: 24; Zúquete, 2008: 93–103). Through these strategies, the leader suc-
cessfully transforms “seemingly secular social and political life” into a sacred quest for
salvation (Michelutti, 2017: 234).
Together, these factors consolidate citizens’ perceptions of the leader’s charisma.
Consistent with existing scholarship, I claim that these perceptions foster deep emotional
bonds between the leader and followers (Eatwell, 2006; Madsen and Snow, 1991;
Pappas, 2011; Shils, 1965; Weber 1978 [1922]; Willner and Willner, 1965; Zúquete,
2008). Direct recognition of people’s exclusion and suffering makes followers feel
indebted to the leader; bold, initially successful reforms deliver tangible improvements
to the followers’ lives and appear to substantiate the leader’s exceptional capacities; and
the symbolic narrative solidifies the leader’s role as the ultimate saviour. Yet while these
conditions are essential to foster personalistic connections in the first place, I go a step
further to argue that the symbolic narrative can transform these ties into a deeper and
more resilient identification with the movement by sustaining the leader’s core promise
of redemption – even after his death.
Specifically, I argue that the narrative sustains the movement through the followers’
cherished, intimate memories of the founder and through timeless symbols that reinforce
his glorified status. Research in social psychology suggests the relevance of a “death
positivity bias,” in which citizens’ inflate their positive perceptions of leaders after the
leaders die (Allison et al., 2009: 116). More specifically, a recent study indicates that
citizens tend to view leaders whom they considered to be “morally virtuous” in life as
more charismatic in death (Steffens et al., 2017: 532). This literature casts doubt on the
notion that charismatic bonds routinise or fade away when the leader dies. Indeed, it
suggests that, because such attachments can endure and even intensify, followers are
likely to continue worshipping the deceased founder and reinforcing his symbolic nar-
rative for years, even across generations. Thus, over time, these attachments transform
into a durable political identity that shapes the followers’ worldview, sustains their
loyalty to the movement, and shapes their expectations of future politicians (Abdelal
et al., 2009; Hogg, 2001; Vugt and Hart, 2004).
In short, unlike scholars of charisma who argue that symbols associated with the
founder help diffuse his charisma and depersonalise attachments (e.g. Jowitt, 1992;
Shils, 1965; Weber 1978 [1922]), I contend that the symbolic narrative helps sustain the
followers’ deeply emotional bonds as well as a fervent hope that a new leader will pick
up the founder’s baton and save them from their suffering. The hope that a worthy
successor will sooner or later take the founder’s place is crucial because it sustains
citizens’ support for the movement until conditions permit the rise of such a leader.
Chávez’s leadership in Venezuela strongly reflects all three components of the per-
sonalistic mechanism, suggesting that it underlies citizens’ steadfast loyalty to his
movement. Firstly, he personally recognised and symbolically incorporated masses of
impoverished citizens who had suffered from decades of socioeconomic and political
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exclusion under the preceding Punto Fijo regime.2 A speech by Chávez on 10 January
2003 illustrates how he claimed personal responsibility for poor and excluded groups:
[ . . . ] Make no mistake about Hugo Chávez [ . . . ] in accordance with the Constitution of the
Republic and my powers as Chief of State and my responsibilities as President of the
Republic, I cannot permit that people die of hunger; I cannot permit that children die
because there isn’t medicine or there isn’t milk; I cannot permit that the people drown of
hunger and death. Above all things it is my responsibility in front of God and the flag to
defend the Venezuelan people, above all things and as dictated by the Bolivarian Consti-
tution! (Chávez, 2003, author’s translation)
Chávez’s promises to single-handedly protect people from hunger, disease, and death
demonstrate how he sought to personally recognise and incorporate excluded sectors of
the population.
Secondly, the daring nature and initial success of Chávez’s reforms confirmed his
image in the hearts and minds of his followers as a hero who would save them from the
malevolent “political class.” One such reform was his bold yet unsustainable approach to
constitutional reform. During his 1998 presidential campaign, Chávez vowed to enact a
new constitution to break with the Punto Fijo regime, protect Venezuelans’ socio-
economic rights, and enhance their direct participation in politics. In June 1999, the
constitutional referendum passed with 72 per cent support, validating Chávez’s ability to
deliver on his promises. In the long run, however, Chávez failed to realise many of the
ambitious visions outlined in his new constitution. For instance, his regime never
developed the political infrastructure necessary to expand and guarantee citizens’ new
rights to healthcare, work, education, social security, and housing (Maingon, 2004: 54–
55). Rather than addressing these failures, Chávez reformed the constitution again in his
second term through executive decrees and “organic laws” rushed through the National
Assembly (López, 2003). As before, the sweeping changes these reforms promised were
scarcely fulfilled. Nevertheless, Chávez’s audacity to propose and ratify them through
referenda or executive decree appeared unprecedented, impressive, and even miraculous
(Hawkins, 2010: 35).
Thirdly, to stress the transformative power of his movement, Chávez constructed a
vivid narrative with “missionary” rhetoric that glorified his image and tied him to classic
heroes, including Simón Bolı́var, Venezuela’s nineteenth-century liberator; Ezequiel
Zamora, the hero of Venezuela’s Federal War; Guiacaipuro, an indigenous Venezuelan
chief who fought against the Spanish Conquest; and even Jesus Christ (Martı́nez and de
Lustgarten 2014: 19–21; Michelutti, 2017: 237–238; Zúquete, 2008: 97). More than
merely associating himself with these legends, Chávez portrayed himself as sharing
“divine kinship” with them; most notably, “he cultivated the notion that he was Bolı́var’s
true heir,” suggesting that he, like Bolı́var, should be worshipped “like a Catholic saint”
(Michelutti, 2017: 237). By depicting himself as the true son of Venezuela’s most
celebrated and tragic hero, Chávez tapped into several preexisting identities relevant to
his followers, ranging from popular Christianity to mestizaje to Santerı́a, and thus ini-
tiated his own “process of deification” (Michelutti, 2017: 234–236).3
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In addition to confirming his godlike status, Chávez used his symbolic narrative to
demonise his opponents. While he affectionately called his followers “patriots” and
“soldiers,” he referred to his critics as “enemies,” “coup-plotters,” and “imperialists”
(Gauna, 2018: 47). As with the protagonists in his narrative, Chávez tied these adver-
saries to Venezuela’s historical foes, especially imperial powers – such as Spain, the
United States, Britain, and France – and the “antipatriots” descended from the “Empire,”
who constituted the country’s the white upper and middle classes (Zúquete, 2008: 104).
Finally, the narrative promised his followers salvation from these enemies through a
dramatic societal transformation – a “Moral Revolution” – that would vanquish evil and
reclaim peace and prosperity for Chávez’s righteous people (Gauna, 2018: 48).
To build his symbolic narrative, the founder established constant, direct communi-
cation with his followers through speeches and other performances that dominated media
outlets. The extreme frequency of his contact with his followers and the repetition of the
central themes of his narrative mattered as much as the content of any particular speech.
As the star of his own weekly television show, he spoke directly into the camera for
hours. He frequently interrupted radio and television programmes to make “emergency”
announcements and travelled tirelessly around the country. Finally, Chávez tightened
control over the media and saturated public spaces with symbols that glorified him and
his movement. When combined with his recognition of previously excluded citizens and
his implementation of bold reforms, the omnipresence of Chávez’s narrative transformed
Bolivarianism into “a charismatic form of political religion” to which his followers
became deeply attached (Zúquete, 2008: 92).
Assessing the Relevance of Alternative Linkage Types
The preceding section outlined the conditions under which personalistic attachments
form and demonstrated the role of these ties in Chávez’s Bolivarian movement. Yet
evaluating the impact of charisma also requires analysis of competing linkage types. The
present section assesses the development of programmatic and organisational ties – two
prominent, alternative types of political attachment – and demonstrates how persona-
listic ties won out in Venezuela.
The Programmatic Mechanism
Firstly, a programmatic mechanism suggests that citizens’ attachments rest on the
substantive coherence of the leader’s ambitious programmes. Grounded in long-standing
studies of issue preferences, retrospective and prospective economic voting, and parti-
sanship, most scholars assume that this mechanism forms the natural and proper core of
party and electoral politics. To develop programmatic ties, citizens must have well-
formed issue preferences that align with the leader’s policies (Key, 1966: 7–8). In
addition, the leader must consistently and successfully carry out these policies to earn
voters’ approval and establish a clear programmatic trademark that is distinct from that
of other parties (Fiorina, 1981: 66; Lupu, 2013: 60). In contrast to bold, shortsighted
reforms, whose initially impressive performance casts the individual leader in a heroic
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light, the programmatic trademark rests on the substantive content and steady func-
tioning of social and economic policies. Citizens “constantly update” their attachment to
the movement based on the leader’s adherence to this trademark (Kitschelt et al., 2010:
846). If the leader fails to implement distinctive and effective policies, citizens punish
him and they reduce their attachment to the movement (Achen, 2002: 151). In turn, if the
leader implements policies inconsistent with the trademark, the trademark becomes
diluted and blends with the platforms of opposing parties, diminishing citizens’ loyalty
(Lupu, 2013: 50).
Several scholars claim that Chávez developed a programmatic trademark that
emphasised state-centred economics and redistributive social programmes called mis-
sions. To begin, Chávez attempted to increase the state’s role in the economy. For
instance, he tightened his control over the state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA), by ratifying the New Organic Hydrocarbon Law in 2001 (Parker, 2005: 44).
Shortly thereafter, he nationalised dozens of non-oil companies and implemented a
sweeping Land Reform Law. He also eventually imposed strict currency exchange and
price controls to counteract inflation and keep consumer goods affordable (Corrales and
Penfold, 2015: 64).
However, Chávez did not stake out a clear position on economic policy until late
2001, well after he had consolidated widespread popular support. Upon taking office, he
confirmed his centre-right predecessor’s minister of finance, Maritza Izaguirre, and
appeased the International Monetary Fund by cutting the state’s budget by 7 per cent
and strengthening the Investment Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilization (Corrales and
Penfold, 2015: 48–55). Despite these economically liberal policies, which diverged
fundamentally from his later turn to “socialism of the twenty-first century,” Chávez’s
movement cultivated impressive popular support: in 1999 and 2000, between 38 and 41
per cent of Venezuelans claimed to identify with the movement and 75–84 per cent
approved of Chávez’s performance (Consultores, in press).
By late 2001, Chávez began to advertise and implement state-centred policies that
achieved impressive results at the outset. But the performance of these policies soon
dropped, providing little foundation for programmatic support. For example, though
booming oil prices from late 2003 to 2008 allowed for substantial economic growth,
his protectionist policies failed to stimulate investment and instead invited rampant
corruption (Corrales and Penfold, 2015: 70; Ellner, 2010: 88–91). As a result, pro-
duction in non-oil sectors declined, leading to sharp rises in imported goods; invest-
ment in infrastructure lagged, generating electricity and water shortages; and price and
exchange controls caused increasing inflation, a rising black-market exchange rate,
consumer goods shortages, and capital flight. The economy contracted by 3.3 per cent
of GDP when oil prices fell in 2009, and in 2010, Chávez was forced to devalue the
local currency sharply. The ultimate failure of these policies and the resulting inflation
and shortages disproportionately affected low-income citizens, many of whom were
strong supporters of Bolivarianism. This suggests that these citizens’ loyalty to Chávez
over the course of his presidency was not fundamentally rooted in the substantive
content and consistent performance of his economic programmes (Corrales and Pen-
fold, 2015: 63–70).
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In addition to state-centred economics, the Bolivarian programmatic trademark
advocated redistributive social “missions.” Beginning with their launch in 2003, Chávez
poured billions of petrodollars into these programmes and oversaw the construction of at
least 50, in areas ranging from healthcare to information technology (Maingon, 2016:
20). The most prominent missions sought to reduce poverty and inequality through better
provision of food, healthcare, education, and housing. Through these programmes,
Chávez appeared to prioritise equality and social justice over individual rights.
Yet like his economic policies, Chávez’s social missions suffered from serious
problems. The missions sprang up via presidential decree in a rapid, improvisational, and
politicised manner that undercut their sustainability. Consequently, they failed to per-
form favourably after their first few years of operation. While poverty declined from
2003 to 2006, the trend stagnated from 2007 to 2012 and began to reverse thereafter
(Aponte, 2014: 153; Ellner, 2011: 433–438; Maingon, 2016119–120). By 2014, poverty
had risen to 48.4 per cent, surpassing 1998 levels by over 3 percentage points (España,
2014: 4). Finally, despite the missions’ rapid initial growth, a 2014 survey indicates that
a mere 10 per cent of citizens report having benefitted from them, suggesting a failure to
sustainably reduce poverty and protect Venezuelans’ socioeconomic rights (Aponte,
2014: 168; España, 2014: 8). Thus, it is more likely that followers’ fervent approval of
Chávez’s programmes throughout this period arose from “lingering beliefs in [his]
charisma” than from the substantive integrity of his policies (Kitschelt et al., 2010: 865;
Merolla and Zechmeister, 2011: 29).
In sum, the superficial nature and volatile performance of Chávez’s socioeconomic
policies indicate his preference for dramatic reform over stable programmatic devel-
opment. Though he promised to establish economic and social justice in Venezuela, his
policies’ delayed implementation and ultimately negative performance made for a weak
programmatic trademark. Most importantly, the bold, hasty application and short-lived
success of these policies prioritised the establishment of Chávez’s saviour-like image at
the expense of medium- and long-term effectiveness. Consequently, while deepening
followers’ affective ties to Chávez, these policies held little appeal for programmatically
principled voters. Moreover, the delayed application of Chávez’s policies cannot account
for the movement’s widespread support during his first three years in office. These
factors demonstrate how personalism infused Chávez’s policy agenda and compromised
the development of programmatic linkages.
The Organisational Mechanism
The organisational mechanism suggests that political attachments rest on the ties people
cultivate with each other through local involvement in movement-affiliated activities
and groups. Through these ties, citizens foster an enduring group identity that is main-
tained via involvement in the movement’s social clubs, neighbourhood associations, and
political organisations (Granovetter, 1973; Green et al., 2002). Building this type of bond
requires the followers’ widespread and regular participation. The movement’s organi-
sations must also be sustained and strengthened over time and must maintain a
“horizontal” rather than hierarchical character to inspire group members’ feelings of
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efficacy (Ellner, 2011: 430–431; Rhodes-Purdy, 2015: 423–424). Unlike personalistic
attachments, in which followers’ sense of belonging comes directly from the leader, the
organisational mechanism suggests that the followers ease their feelings of exclusion in a
bottom-up fashion by interacting with each other.
Chávez promoted the organisational dynamic of Bolivarianism and even enshrined
citizen participation in the 1999 constitution as a necessary condition for democracy.
Early in his presidency, he launched several community-based organisations aimed at
placing governance into the hands of the people, including Urban Land Committees,
Health Committees, Technical Roundtables for Water, and Bolivarian Circles (Aponte,
2014: 252–263). In 2006, he appeared to strengthen this initiative by establishing the
Communal Councils (CCs). Officially registered, neighbourhood-level groups consist-
ing of 200–400 families, the CCs were intended to be self-governing: they would elect
representatives, run their own meetings, and solicit funds directly from the government
to resolve problems (Aponte, 2014: 264; Garcı́a-Guadilla, 2012).
In practice, however, this network failed to cultivate genuine organisational ties to the
movement. Firstly, citizen participation in the CCs was neither widespread nor regular.
A 2005–2007 survey of poor Venezuelans by Universidad Católica Andrés Bello sug-
gests that only 29 per cent had ever participated in a community event, while only 7 per
cent had participated in a CC (Aponte, 2014: 260). Among the few citizens who parti-
cipated in CCs, a 2008 survey by Centro Gumilla indicates that less than 50 per cent
regularly attended meetings (Machado, 2009: 48-9). Secondly, the poor infrastructure of
these groups compromised followers’ ability to develop a strong grassroots network.
Chávez’s sluggish and haphazard institutionalisation of the CCs reflects this weakness:
he did not legally recognise them through the Law of CCs until 2006, and he neglected to
establish a government ministry to oversee them until 2010 (Aponte, 2014: 264). By
2012, in a famous speech titled “Changing Course” (Golpe de Timón), Chávez angrily
acknowledged the weakness of his movement’s grassroots spirit (Chávez, 2012).
Thirdly, much evidence indicates that the CCs functioned in a hierarchical fashion. In
many CCs, a mere handful of members remained active, and leaders often served as
party bosses rather than local representatives, usurping control over projects and funds at
the expense of other residents (Garcı́a-Guadilla, 2012: 227–235). Perhaps as a result, a
2009 survey by Centro Gumilla suggests 76 per cent of Venezuelans perceived CCs as
corrupt, while 77 per cent agreed that CCs did not involve most members of their
community (Aponte, 2014: 271; Machado, 2009: 37).
Ultimately, the evidence suggests that the CCs did not foster genuine grassroots
empowerment. While Chávez extolled the virtues of participatory democracy and made
dramatic (if irregular) efforts to establish community organisations, these groups suf-
fered low participation rates and severe institutional weaknesses. Outspoken leaders
dominated many CCs and bred distrust rather than a genuine participatory spirit. Fur-
thermore, citizens’ feelings of recognition and inclusion depended more on their
devotion to Chávez than involvement in community affairs. It is, therefore, unlikely that
swaths of followers developed strong attachments to Bolivarianism based on an orga-
nisational mechanism.
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Bolivarian Attachments After Chávez
Since Chávez’s death in March 2013, Venezuela has fallen into even greater disarray.
The economy has collapsed, and Bolivarian social programmes have failed to meet
citizens’ basic needs. The movement’s fragile network of CCs has further eroded, and
the movement’s charismatic figurehead has been replaced with Nicolás Maduro, an
inadequate and unsavory successor. Owing to these factors, several scholars argue that
Bolivarian loyalty is fading (Denis, 2015; e.g., López, 2014). This claim reflects con-
ventional understandings of charisma developed in political science and sociology: after
the leader’s death, citizens’ deep ties to the individual either fade away or transform into
depersonalised attachments that rest on robust political programmes and institutions
(Jowitt, 1992: 107; Madsen and Snow, 1991: 24; Weber 1978 [1922]: 246).
Yet polling in the years since Chávez’s death suggests that citizens’ attachments to
Bolivarianism have remained impressively resilient, reflecting the insights from social
psychology that citizens idealise charismatic leaders and intensify their attachments to
them after the leaders die (Allison et al., 2009; Steffens et al., 2017). Indeed, while
support for President Maduro has dropped to about 15 per cent, over 30 per cent of
Venezuelans – about the same proportion as in 2012, just before Chávez’s death – have
continued to express strong identification with the movement years later (Briceño, 2015;
GBAO Strategies, 2019). In light of deteriorating Bolivarian programmes and organi-
sations as well as Maduro’s failed leadership, I argue that the followers’ loyalty to the
movement has persisted due to their deeply affective bonds with the charismatic founder.
The ways in which supporters have upheld Chávez’s symbolic narrative demonstrate
how they have managed to sustain personalistic attachments to the movement in his
absence. Indeed, followers have continued to worship Chávez as an immortal spirit by
constructing shrines dedicated to him in their homes, donning tattoos and necklaces of
his eyes to watch over them, and replaying recordings of his speeches and television
shows. Moreover, supporters have remained committed to the overarching mission of
salvation enshrined in his narrative. Because this “scripture” hinges on the heroic power
of a leader, it gives the followers hope that an impressive successor – a true heir of
Chávez – will eventually rise and carry the movement forward. This faith in a better
future delivered by a new, charismatic leader serves to strengthen rather than undermine
citizens’ personalistic attachments to the movement.
Maduro’s behaviour as president further illustrates how the symbolic narrative
reinforces citizens’ support for Bolivarianism. Instead of enacting desperately needed
policy reforms or revamping the institutional structure of the movement, the new
president has focused relentlessly on Chávez’s mission to transform society and van-
quish the movement’s enemies. He has also stressed his quasi-religious connection to the
founder to keep citizens’ affective attachments alive and vicariously garner support. For
example, after becoming president, Maduro started referring to himself as “the son of
Chávez” (Michelutti, 2017: 244).4 He even claimed that, after death, Chávez had
returned to Earth reincarnated as a bird to offer a personal blessing to Maduro (Schar-
fenberg, 2013). In 2016, he developed a hologram of Chávez that walked the streets of
Caracas to celebrate the “Day of Loyalty and Love for our Commander Hugo Chávez
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Frı́as” (Alvarado, 2016). By reconstructing the founder’s image, Maduro has leveraged
citizens’ personalistic bonds to defend the contemporary regime and decry all who
oppose it as traitors to Chávez’s legacy. Consequently, he has sustained crucial support
for a strikingly long time, given the deplorable performance of his regime (Taub and
Fisher, 2017).
To be sure, Maduro’s symbolic tactics alone cannot sustain followers’ continued
support, especially as the economic crisis deepens. Indeed, the opposition’s sweeping
112-seat victory in the December 2015 legislative elections (the Bolivarian regime won
just 55 seats), as well as the president’s unabashedly authoritarian tactics, suggests that
Maduro’s legitimacy is fading. However, his personal decline does not necessarily imply
that the movement is doomed to fail. In fact, while many followers disapprove of
Maduro, they remain loyal to Chávez and deeply committed to his transformative
mission. They are also deeply suspicious of opposition leaders. As two opposition
candidates in the 2015 parliamentary elections emphasised in interviews with the author,
steadfast devotion to the Bolivarian narrative makes it exceedingly difficult to construct
alternative narratives to win followers’ support.5
In short, despite Maduro’s deplorable performance, the preservation of Chávez’s
symbolic narrative has helped prop up his regime and, more importantly, has helped
sustain citizens’ deep, emotional loyalty to the movement. This underscores the con-
tinued relevance of personalistic attachments. The following sections marshal evidence
to examine the impact of personalism on citizens’ lasting commitment to the movement.
A Quantitative Test of the Personalistic Mechanism
I draw from a nationally representative survey conducted by LAPOP to quantitatively
investigate the impact of personalism on citizens’ Bolivarian attachments relative to
programmatic and organisational factors (The AmericasBarometer by the Latin Amer-
ican Public Opinion Project). The survey contains relevant questions for all aspects of
my analysis, including Bolivarian attachment (dependent variable); evaluation of eco-
nomic and social policies (programmatic independent variables); participation in the
Bolivarian CCs (organisational independent variable); and perceptions of Chávez’s
charisma (personalistic independent variable). In addition, the survey was fielded in
2007, shortly after Chávez’s second reelection. By that time, voters had several years to
experience and evaluate both programmatic and grassroots components of Chávez’s
movement, including the social missions and CCs. The survey thus allows for an
important analysis of the personalistic mechanism’s relative strength at a crucial point
during Chávez’s rule.
The Dependent Variable
I construct the dependent variable – attachment to Bolivarianism – using a question on
respondents’ party identification. Political scientists have long understood party iden-
tification as a genuine expression of membership in or attachment to a political group
(Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002; Lupu, 2013). Venezuelans’ identification with
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Bolivarian parties, therefore, captures their self-perceived political ties more adequately
than vote choice, which can result from a range of factors extending beyond attachment
to the movement. I create a dichotomous measure of attachment where citizens who
identify with one of three parties associated with Chávez’s Bolivarian movement –
Movement of the Fifth Republic, Fatherland for All (PPT), or the United Socialist Party
of Venezuela (PSUV) – are considered “attached” while citizens who do not are con-
sidered “not attached.” Twenty-three per cent of all respondents express attachment to
Bolivarian parties, while just under 9 per cent identify with non-Bolivarian parties. Due
to the weakly institutionalised nature of Bolivarianism, measuring identification with
associated parties likely underestimates the number of Venezuelans attached to the
broader movement. Nevertheless, I use this measure because the survey does not ask
about attachment to the movement per se – and I assume that citizens who identify with
affiliated parties have genuine attachments to the movement as well.6
The Independent Variables
I select several survey items as independent variables to represent the three mechanisms.
For personalism, I incorporate a five-question battery on perceptions of Chávez’s
charisma developed by Merolla and Zechmeister (2011).7 This focus on citizens’ per-
ceptions of the leader, rather than “objective” personality traits, captures the essence of
charismatic authority (Weber 1978 [1922]: 242). Additionally, the factors underlying the
personalistic mechanism – direct recognition, bold reforms, and the symbolic narrative –
increase perceptions of the leader’s charisma, suggesting the validity of the measure.
Though many successful leaders are perceived as charismatic, scholars have stressed
that, relative to other Latin American presidents, perceptions of Chávez’s charisma were
uniquely high throughout his tenure (Hawkins, 2010: 37–38; Merolla and Zechmeister,
2011: 37–38; Weyland, 2003: 822; Zúquete, 2008: 91). Furthermore, while related to
party attachment, leader approval, and vote choice, charismatic perceptions remain a
theoretically and empirically distinct concept.8
The questions in the charisma battery ask respondents to report on a four-point scale
the extent to which they agree that: “Chávez articulates a compelling vision of the
future,” “Chávez instills pride in being associated with him,” “Chávez’s actions build my
respect for him,” “Chávez considers the moral and ethical consequences of his deci-
sions,” and “Chávez goes beyond his own self-interest for the good of the group”
(Merolla and Zechmeister, 2011: 37). I add and rescale these items to create a continuous
score of Chávez’s charisma ranging from zero (not at all charismatic) to one (very
charismatic).9
For the programmatic mechanism, I first include survey items that gauge respondents’
perceptions of Chávez’s economic performance. Following Merolla and Zechmeister
(2011), I combine four questions – on current and retrospective evaluations of the
economy at the national and personal levels – into a single variable using factor analysis,
then rescale the variable to range from zero (bad) to one (good). It is important to note
that this indicator does not exclusively reflect the programmatic mechanism. Indeed,
citizens could give positive evaluations because they approve of the regime’s economic
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programmes or because they perceive Chávez as a saviour who makes good on his
promise to rescue the people. As Merolla and Zechmeister suggest, “individuals who
perceive Chávez as highly charismatic see Venezuela’s economy [ . . . ] through rose-
colored glasses” (2011: 31). In other words, charismatic perceptions of Chávez may
cause respondents evaluate the economy more favourably. To examine this possibility, I
run one set of models in which economic evaluations and charismatic perceptions are
independent and a second set of models in which they are interacted. The interaction
term will shed light on whether and how charismatic perceptions impact the effect of
economic evaluations on citizens’ attachments to Bolivarianism.
In addition to economic performance, I incorporate two questions on respondents’
assessments of Chávez’s two largest social programmes to measure the strength of the
programmatic mechanism – the health mission (Barrio Adentro) and the food mission
(Mercal). I add these evaluations and rescale the sum to range from zero (bad) to one
(good). Incorporating these variables cuts the sample size by over half (N¼ 641) because
only about 50 and 70 per cent of respondents report having used the health and food
missions, respectively. To address this issue, one set of models examines whether
respondents accessed these missions in the first place, while a second set explores the
subsample of respondents who report having used both missions. Whereas the former
variable measures access to the missions, which tends to be restricted based on parti-
sanship (Hawkins et al., 2011), the latter more closely reflects citizens’ substantive
evaluation of those programmes.
To measure the influence of participation in movement-affiliated organisations on
Bolivarian attachment, I incorporate a question about respondents’ involvement in CCs.
Because the CCs represent the movement’s central network of participatory organisa-
tions, respondents with organisational ties should report extensive involvement in these
groups. I rescale a four-point scale in which one is “never” and four is “every week” to
range from zero (low) to one (high).
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables.
Variable Scale N Mean Standard deviation
Bolivarian attachmenta 0–1 1,510 0.23 0.42
Charismatic perceptions 0–1 1,438 0.55 0.36
Economic evaluations 0–1 1,474 0.50 0.22
Mission recipient 0–1 1,510 0.60 0.39
Evaluation of missions 0–1 641 0.84 0.21
CC participation 0–1 1,495 0.25 0.36
Socioeconomic status 0–1 1,510 0.58 0.24
Education (years) 0–20 1,509 10.50 4.45
Age 18–89 1,510 36.27 14.06
Femalea 0–1 1,510 0.50 0.50
Urbana 0–1 1,510 0.95 0.21
Note: CC ¼ Communal Council.
aThe proportion rather than the mean is given for dichotomous variables.
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Finally, I incorporate four control variables thought to influence citizens’ identifi-
cation with Bolivarianism: socioeconomic status, education, age, and gender.10 Table 1
displays descriptive statistics for the key-dependent and key-independent variables for
Table 2. Binary Logistic Regression Results.
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Charismatic perceptions 4.06*** (0.36) 3.74*** (0.49) 6.32*** (1.04) 6.65*** (1.51)
Economic evaluations 0.79 (0.41) 0.52 (0.52) 4.26** (1.50) 4.85* (2.11)
Charismatic Perceptions 
Economic Evaluations
– – 4.32* (1.77) 5.30* (2.49)
Mission recipient 1.26*** (0.23) – 1.25*** (0.23) –
Evaluation of missions – 0.48 (0.53) – 0.42 (0.53)
CC participation 0.17 (0.20) 0.29 (0.25) 0.20 (0.20) 0.32 (0.25)
Socioeconomic status 0.18 (0.33) 0.02 (0.43) 0.20 (0.33) 0.04 (0.43)
Education 0.05** (0.02) 0.07** (0.03) 0.05** (0.02) 0.07** (0.03)
Age 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
Female 0.19 (0.15) 0.20 (0.19) 0.19 (0.15) 0.20 (0.19)
Urban 0.22 (0.35) 0.59 (0.47) 0.24 (0.35) 0.63 (0.47)
Intercept 6.65*** (0.55) 6.11*** (0.84) 8.52*** (0.99) 7.92*** (1.38)
N 1,390 607 1,390 607
Pseudo r2 0.29 0.20 0.29 0.20




Model A (All Respondents) Model B (Mission Users Only)
Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Bolivarian Attachment at Different Levels of Charismatic
Perceptions.
Note: Model A (all respondents); model B (mission users only); 95-per cent confidence intervals
shown.
312 Journal of Politics in Latin America 11(3)
both surveys. Additional information on the survey can be found in the Online Sup-
plemental Appendix.
In total, I analyse four binary logistic regression models. Models A and C include the
variable on access to the missions and thus include most respondents (N¼ 1326). Models
B and D replace this variable with one on substantive evaluation of the missions among
those who accessed them (N ¼ 579). Finally, models A and B treat charismatic per-
ceptions and economic evaluations independently, whereas models C and D interact the
two variables. The next section discusses the results based on these four models.
Results
The results (see Table 2) suggest the uniquely strong influence of personalism on citi-
zens’ attachments to Bolivarianism. Models A and B suggest that charismatic percep-
tions have a statistically significant and substantively large impact on Bolivarian ties. In
the unrestricted sample (model A), respondents who perceive Chávez as extremely
charismatic (score of one) are 47 percentage points more likely to express attachment
than those who find Chávez extremely uncharismatic (score of zero), holding the
remaining independent variables constant at their means. Among mission users (model
B), this figure rises to 58 points (see Figure 1).
In contrast, the programmatic and organisational variables are only weakly associated
with attachments to the movement. Models A and B suggest that economic performance
does not have a significant, independent impact on Bolivarian attachment. Models C
and D examine the potential interactive effect of charismatic perceptions and economic
evaluations on attachment. Interpreting this effect requires visual examination of pre-
dicted probabilities, as the statistical significance of interactions in nonlinear regression
Model C (All Respondents) Model D (Mission Users Only)
Figure 2. Effect of Economic Evaluations on Probability of Bolivarian Attachment at Different
Levels of Charismatic Perceptions (Interactive Models).
Note: Model C (all respondents); model D (mission users only); 95-per cent confidence intervals
shown.
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does not necessarily indicate a substantively meaningful effect (see Figure 2) (Brambor
et al., 2006: 73–74). Model C suggests no meaningful interactive effect: at different
levels of charismatic perceptions, the influence of economic performance evaluations on
attachment does not change significantly. However, model D suggests that the inter-
active effect may have a small, negative effect among mission users: as charismatic
perceptions of Chávez increase, the effect of performance evaluations on Bolivarian
attachment decreases slightly. While this interaction appears significant, its negative
sign suggests that higher charismatic perceptions dampen the influence of performance
evaluations, further indicating the power of personalism on citizens’ loyalty to the
movement.
In terms of social programmes, accessing benefits from one or both missions sig-
nificantly increases the probability of expressing attachment to the movement. However,
as discussed above, this does not necessarily suggest that the programmatic mechanism
is at work. In fact, among mission users (model B), substantive assessments of the
missions have no significant effect, suggesting that the quality of these programmes does
not influence respondents’ attachments. Finally, in both models, participation in the CCs
has no significant association with attachment. These data indicate the relative weakness
of the programmatic and grassroots mechanisms while further highlighting the strong
effects of personalism on loyalty to the movement. Taken together, the four models
suggest the relative insignificance of programmatic and organisational factors on Boli-
varian attachments while highlighting the disproportionate influence of charismatic
perceptions of Chávez.
To ensure the validity of the results, I explore two alternative explanations for the
underwhelming effects of programmatic and organisational factors. Firstly, in the
additive models (A and B), multi-collinearity between charismatic perceptions and the
other independent variables could artificially inflate the significance of the former and
depress that of the latter. However, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for charisma for
both models is low (1.66 and 1.48, respectively), suggesting that multi-collinearity does
not account for the results.11 Secondly, preference falsification may explain the insig-
nificance of these variables. Specifically, respondents could feel pressured to evaluate
Chávez’s charisma more highly than they otherwise might. Yet citizens generally do not
hesitate to express dissatisfaction with Chávez’s regime. In fact, 17 per cent of
respondents perceive Chávez as completely uncharismatic and 56 per cent rate his
performance as mediocre, poor, or very poor. One would expect substantially higher
approval ratings if preference falsification were at play. The remaining explanation
suggests that citizens’ intense perceptions of Chávez’s charisma are intimately linked
with their attachment to his movement, while programmatic and organisational factors
have notably weaker effects.
Personalistic Attachment in the Words of Followers
The models analysed above demonstrate the overwhelming impact of personalism on
citizens’ attachments to Bolivarianism in 2007, partway through Chávez’s rule. I now
turn to focus groups conducted in March 2016 to investigate the evolution of these bonds
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and the status of the movement three years after his death. Focus groups provide several
unique advantages: whereas surveys limit the depth and individual interviews limit the
breadth of citizens’ insights, focus groups allow for thought-provoking discussion
among participants and reflect both their individual experiences and collective under-
standings of the movement (Cyr, 2016). Furthermore, the timing of the focus groups
allows me to gather information on citizens’ affective ties during Chávez’s rule and
explore whether those bonds have remained salient. Given the context, in which
Chávez’s handpicked successor has overseen a severe crisis and deteriorating grassroots
organisations, signs of persistent loyalty to the leader and his movement would indicate
the resilience of the personalistic mechanism.
I partnered with Consultores 21, a Caracas-based public opinion firm, to conduct six
focus groups, each with six to eight self-identified Bolivarian followers from lower- and
lower-middle-class neighbourhoods in and around Caracas. While not a nationally
representative sample, the characteristics of followers in these neighbourhoods reflect
those of followers from around the country. Participants were divided into focus groups
based on two dimensions: Bolivarian orientation (supportive of/opposed to Maduro) and
age (18–24, 25–39, and 40–55).12 Given Venezuela’s polarised political landscape,
dividing participants in this way allowed them to speak openly about their impressions of
and relationships to the movement. An experienced moderator led the discussions, which
focused on participants’ memories of Chávez; perceptions and anecdotes related to
Bolivarianism during Chávez’s lifetime; experience of Bolivarianism after Chávez’s
death; and thoughts and feelings about the movement’s future.13
The discussions revealed insights regarding how citizens’ charismatic identification
with the movement is sustained after Chávez’s death.14 Firstly, consistent with the
movement’s symbolic narrative, the participants praised Chávez not as a past leader
but as an immortal hero whose spirit continues to watch over them and offer protection.
As one participant stated, “What we have is an affective connection. What other
leaders could have done will stay in the past. But with Chávez the connection will live
on in each person.” A second proclaimed, “For me, Chávez was, and will always be,
my hero.” A third stated, “I am Chavista because I believe in Chávez. Because I believe
in what he says [ . . . ] that’s the way it is and the way it will be. I believe in him and
that’s why I’m Chavista.” These visions of Chávez as an everlasting leader indicate
that he remains the central focal point of the movement in death. Furthermore, con-
sistent with social psychology research, the statements suggest that his death has
generated “permanent positive remembrances” in followers’ minds (Allison et al.,
2009: 118). Indeed, the participants’ use of the present and future tenses to describe
him suggests that their bonds to the movement have the potential to survive and remain
emotionally intense in the future.
Secondly, participants shielded Chávez’s sanctified image from the regime’s poor
performance under Maduro, reinforcing that their loyalty to the movement remains tied
to the founder. As those critical of the handpicked successor stated, “Maduro is a bad
Chavista”; “We are more Chavista than Maduro is.” Followers sympathetic to Maduro
further clarified that their loyalty is anchored in Chávez. One participant stated, “There is
a misunderstanding. You know that when Maduro comes to power [ . . . ] he comes to
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power with Chávez, as the son of Chávez, and that’s why we call him Chavista [ . . . ]. I
defend [Maduro] but we aren’t Maduristas [ . . . ] we are Chavistas.” That followers’
identification with the movement remains rooted in Chávez regardless of their feelings
towards Maduro attests to their ongoing closeness to the leader and the resilience of their
devotion to him, validating the presence of post-mortem charisma (Steffens et al., 2017:
532). It also suggests that the movement has the capacity to survive, even during periods
of weakness.
Thirdly, participants expressed ongoing commitment not only to the spirit of Chávez
but also to his mission to “free” righteous people from the malevolent opposition and
achieve both physical and spiritual transformation. The way in which participants
expressed this sentiment reflects the cultural frame of national liberation from conquest
that the founder emphasised so fervently over the course of his rule (Gauna, 2018: 47;
Michelutti, 2017: 237–238). One participant explained, “Chávez awakened his people,
who were in darkness and gloom.” Another stated, “Chávez gifted us a country that he
wanted to be free. Where am I? I am here with him and his people. We are the country,
we are his people.” Yet another declared,
As the people, we have to awaken and we have to maintain a vision of everything Hugo
Chávez Frı́as did [ . . . ]. He was a national leader, a global leader. And why do I say he is still
a leader today? Because even though he isn’t with us physically, his legacy continues, just
like he thought it would, with us as his people giving the movement continuity.
The perception of Chávez’s continued presence in followers’ daily lives suggests his
continued political relevance as well as his godlike status.
Finally, participants demonstrated intense faith that a new, more inspiring leader
would eventually come to power, draw “divine inspiration” from Chávez, and resume the
founder’s mission of salvation (Michelutti, 2017: 237). Specifically, they expressed clear
expectations that a new leader would appear who is “charismatic,” “strong,”
“extraordinarily capable,” “incorruptible,” and “100 per cent Chavista.” This hope for a
new saviour suggests that the followers’ understanding of the movement remains fun-
damentally personalistic and indicates that future politicians would do well to use
charisma to garner support.
In sum, the focus group participants clearly demonstrated that their attachments to
Bolivarianism remain strong and anchored to its founder’s charismatic legacy rather
than to his substantive policies or participatory organisations. As illustrated across all
six focus groups, followers continue to express intense, affective attachments to
Chávez as an immortal spirit, even three years after his death. They also remain
committed to his mission to combat evil forces and express faith that they will emerge
victorious with the help of a new charismatic leader capable of resuming his legacy.
The persistence of this hope is remarkable in light of Venezuela’s severe crisis and
attests to the capacity of charismatic bonds to shape followers’ worldview and carry
the movement forward, even in the absence of effective policies or strong
organisations.
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Discussion and conclusion
This article challenges the conventional wisdom that charisma is ephemeral. By inves-
tigating the mechanisms through which personalistic attachments form and overpower
alternative forms of citizen–politician linkages, I demonstrate its potential to consolidate
resilient support for charismatic leaders and their weakly institutionalised movements.
Recognition of historically marginalised citizens, daring yet short-lived policies, and a
compelling symbolic narrative of redemption that incorporates familiar cultural themes
solidify personalistic bonds and lead citizens to perceive the founder as intensely
charismatic. Leaders who fulfil these conditions foster quasi-religious attachments with
voters and simultaneously undermine programmatic and grassroots linkages: bold pol-
icies compromise effectiveness and sustainability while unmediated, top-down recog-
nition of excluded sectors undermines genuine grassroots participation. Furthermore,
these bonds can survive beyond the leader’s lifetime in their original, personalistic state,
which helps perpetuate the movement without the development of strong party
institutions.
I illustrate my argument using Venezuela’s Bolivarian movement. With data from the
2007 LAPOP survey, I show that voters’ perceptions of the leader’s charisma provide a
stronger, more consistent foundation for attachment than traditional political ties based
on programmatic evaluation and participation in Bolivarian organisations. Though
Chávez proclaimed state-centred economics, redistributive social programmes, and
grassroots organisations as central to his movement, the results suggest his personal
appeal eclipsed these factors. Indeed, most programmatic and organisational elements of
Bolivarianism had no significant relationship with attachment to the movement; in
contrast, citizens’ perceptions of Chávez’s charisma were strongly associated with
Bolivarian ties.
In-depth insights from focus groups with Chávez’s followers further illustrate the
personalistic nature of Bolivarian attachments. The dependence of these bonds on deeply
held emotions and cherished memories also suggests their potential to remain strong
despite Chávez’s death and unfavourable contextual circumstances. Indeed, these
attachments have persisted in the face of devastating economic crisis overseen by
Chávez’s handpicked successor indicates their remarkable resilience and casts doubt on
claims that Bolivarianism has disintegrated.
To further investigate the staying power of charisma, future research should develop
more precise measures of attachment that refer to the larger movement (e.g.
“Bolivarianism” or “Chavismo”) rather than institutionalised parties (e.g. “PSUV”). In
addition, scholars should examine whether the survival of charismatic ties incentivises
future politicians to engage in personalistic rather than programmatic or grassroots
strategies to garner support and should explore the potential consequences for demo-
cratic representation and party institutionalisation. Finally, analysis of similar move-
ments in other contexts such as Argentina, where Peronism has survived for decades, and
Peru, where Fujimorismo sustains a larger and more coherent base of support than any
other political force, will help further generalise the theory and shed light on the potential
of new leaders to reactivate voters’ bonds after the charismatic founder disappears.
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sultores 21 for conducting the focus groups.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/
or publication of this article: The author received funding from a University Graduate School
Continuing Fellowship from the University of Texas at Austin to conduct the fieldwork and focus
groups referenced in this article.
Supplemental material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
1. Kostadinova and Levitt (2014: 494) define personalistic leaders as those seeking legitimacy
based on personal authority rather than institutions. While not all personalistic leaders are
charismatic, they note that all charismatic leaders are, by definition, personalistic. For the sake
of simplicity, and because I address only charismatic personalists in this article, I treat
“personalism” and “charisma” as synonyms.
2. The “Punto Fijo” regime, also called the “Fourth Republic,” refers to the democracy formed
out of the Punto Fijo Pact, signed by select party leaders in 1958, which governed Venezuela
from 1958 to 1999 (Smilde, 2011: 3).
3. Santerı́a is a very popular religious cult in Venezuela that originated in Cuba and celebrates
Afro-Indian heritage (Michelutti, 2017: 238).
4. In referring to himself as the “son of Chávez,” I argue that Maduro is attempting to integrate
himself into the line of “divine kinship” that includes quasi-deities such as Chávez, Bolı́var,
and Christ so as to inherit their charismatic appeal. Although this behaviour seems related to
Weber’s concept of “hereditary charisma,” in which the charismatic leader’s legitimacy is
passed through familial ties, I argue that it is distinct. Indeed, whereas Weber conceived of
hereditary succession as a form of routinisation, in which “personal charisma may be totally
absent,” I argue that Maduro’s associations with Chávez are an effort to embody the former
leader’s personal charisma (1978 [1922]: 248).
5. Author interviews with two opposition candidates running in the December 2015 elections to
become deputies in the National Assembly. Interviews conducted on 15 September 2015 and 2
October 2015, respectively.
6. See Merolla and Zechmeister (2011: 40) for a similar coding strategy.
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7. Merolla and Zechmeister (2011) developed the charisma battery based on a larger set of
questions from the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire – 5X Long Form, which was first
introduced in the United States and has used the battery to assess citizens’ perceptions of
charisma in Mexico and Venezuela.
8. To validate charisma’s conceptual distinctiveness, Merolla and Zechmeister (2011: 51) use
the 2007 LAPOP survey to predict presidential approval with charisma, party identification,
ideology, and performance evaluations. Though charisma has a strong, significant effect on
presidential approval, “these effects do not drown out the influence of other key factors.”
Moreover, while the correlation between charisma, presidential approval, and vote choice is
moderately high, they are “far from perfect,” indicating the empirical distinctiveness of the
charisma battery.
9. Eighty-four per cent of respondents answered all five questions in the battery, whereas 11 per
cent only answered some of the questions. To include these respondents, I impute the mean of
the items in the battery they answered onto the items they did not answer. The five items are
highly correlated (Chronbach’s a ¼ .953), and the imputation does not produce significant
differences in the mean charisma score for the entire sample (mean ¼ .57, SE ¼ .37 before
imputation; mean ¼ .55, SE ¼ .36 after imputation).
10. I construct a weighted index of household assets to measure socioeconomic status to reduce
the non-response bias associated with questions on respondents’ income (Córdova, 2009).
11. Scholars suggest multi-collinearity issues emerge when the VIF ranges from 2.5 (conserva-
tive) to 10 (lenient) (Allison, 2012).
12. Venezuelans often refer to the Bolivarian movement as “Chavismo” and its followers as
“Chavistas,” as demonstrated in the focus group discussions. Followers unsupportive of
Maduro are referred to as “Chavistas no Maduristas.” This group constitutes about 16 per
cent of all Venezuelans and 52 per cent of all Bolivarian followers (Briceño).
13. See the Online Appendix for further information on the research design and sample questions
from the script.
14. The author analysed and translated the focus groups discussions using audio and video record-
ings and transcripts. Original wording in Spanish is available upon request.
References
Abdelal R, Herrera YN, Johnston AI, et al. (2009) Identity as a variable. In: Abdelal R, Herrera
YN, Johnston AI, et al. (eds) Measuring Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
17–32.
Achen CH (2002) Parental socialization and rational party identification. Political Behavior 24(2):
151–170.
Allison P (2012) When can you safely ignore multicollinearity? Statistical Horizon. Available at:
http://statisticalhorizons.com (accessed 2 January 2016).
Allison ST, Eylon D, Beggan JK, et al. (2009) The demise of leadership: positivity and negativity
biases in evaluations of dead leaders. The Leadership Quarterly 20(2): 115–129.
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